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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH#
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 860259-CA

v.
Category No. 2

MICHELLE DAVIS PURSIFULL,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION
This appeal is from a conviction of unlawful possession
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute for value, a
third-degree

felony,

District Court.

after

a

trial

in

the

Third

Judicial

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal

under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether Defendant's failure to make a single citation
to the record in her brief should itself result in
affirmance of the judgment below.

2.

Whether exigent circumstances justified the limited,
warrantless search of Defendant's residence.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
U.S. Const, amend. IV provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly

describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Michelle Davis Pursifull, was charged with
unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute for value, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii) (1986), on April 16, 1986 (R. 1011).
Defendant made

a motion to suppress evidence found

during two searches of Defendant's residence, which was heard on
August

4,

1986

(R.

211-25)

and

memorandum decision (R. 19-21).

denied

the

same

day

in a

Defendant's motion to suppress

was renewed and again denied at trial (R. 491-96).

Defendant was

convicted of the crime charged in a jury trial held on August 26
and 27, 1986, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith M. Billings
presiding

(R. 226-577).

Judge Billings sentenced Defendant on

October 3, 1986, to serve not more than five years in the Utah
State Prison.

Judge Billings stayed execution of the prison

sentence, placed Defendant on probation, and required Defendant
to serve thirty days in the Salt Lake County Jail as a condition
of probation (R. 80-81).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties verbally stipulated to the following facts
at the hearing on Defendants motion to suppress:

On April 14,

1986, at 7:43 a.m., police officers received notice of a shooting
at

Defendants

residence

(R.

213-14).

- 2 -

There

they

found

Defendants boyfriend lying in the driveway and being treated by
emergency medical technicians for a fatal gunshot wound (R. 214).
One of the officers questioned Defendant about what had happened,
and other officers conducted a warrantless, victim-or-suspect
search to secure the premises.

Defendant told the officer that

her boyfriend had answered a knock at the door that morning and
had been shot in the chest by an assailant, whom he chased before
returning

to the apartment and asking Defendant to call an

ambulance (R. 214).
During the course of the victim-or-suspect search, an
officer observed what appeared to be three bales of marijuana in
a linen closet1 next to the master bedroom.2

Based upon this

information, the Narcotics Division obtained a search warrant,
thoroughly

searched

marijuana

as

paraphernalia11

the

well
which

as

premises,

and

"numerous

Defendant

seized

other

contends

the

bales

of

drugs

and

drug

should

have

been

suppressed (R. 216). 3
1

The closet was full size (R. 221), and the parties
stipulated that "the closet door was the same size and type of
any closet door . . . in a home" (R. 224). See State's Exhibit
1-S, a photograph of the open closet (R. 249) (Appendix A ) .
2

Testimony at trial established that the officer opened the
door of the closet, smelled marijuana, and discovered three
large, white garbage bags, the contents of which could not be
seen, except for the top one, which was open to reveal "a leafy
substance which appear[ed] to be marijuana" (R. 248-250). See
State's Exhibit 1-S (Appendix A ) .
3

According to testimony at trial, the search of Defendant's
residence revealed a total of 55 pounds of marijuana in different
locations (R. 266-69, 275-77) with a street value of $88,000 (R.
278-29, 337). The search also yielded a balance scale suitable
for measuring amounts of marijuana, which was found in the master
- 3 -

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Since Defendant has failed to refer to any portion of
the record that factually supports her contentions on appeal,
this Court should assume the correctness of the judgment below.
Police officers in this case were well within Mincey
guidelines in conducting a warrantless, victim-or-suspect search
of Defendants residence and in obtaining a search warrant on the
basis of evidence which was in plain view in the course of that
search.

Defendant's consent to the search and any account she

may have given officers of the shooting incident are irrelevant.
ARGUMENT
I.

ABSENT CITATION TO THE RECORD TO SUPPORT
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR, THE JUDGMENT OF THE
TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
Defendant makes not a single citation to the record in

her entire brief.4

Her argument is based partly on the account

she allegedly gave police officers of the shooting incident, but
bedroom along with Defendant's clothing and belongings (R. 26366, 483-84), and a tray containing marijuana residue, probably
used in packaging, from the kitchen (R. 277, 335). A room in the
basement "appeared to be used solely for the packaging of
marijuana" (R. 338).
It contained a table with a special,
pointed shape ideal for marijuana packaging (R. 293, 338), a
large amount of marijuana residue on the table and floor (R. 338,
363), another balance scale (R. 278, 365), and two boxes of "zip
lock type sandwich bags" (R. 278, 363). Two garbage bags filled
with cut marijuana stems, seeds, and other scraps and residue
were found outside the packaging room (R. 341-42, 364-65).
The evidence in controversy was identified at R. 264-78
and offered and received at R. 314-15, 372-73.
4

Defendant did not cite to the trial transcript in writing
her brief because she failed to have it prepared, instead leaving
the State with the burden of doing so. However, Defendant failed
to cite even to the hearing transcript of her motion to suppress
and the various documents which were available to her.
- 4 -

there is no citation to this account.

Portions of the facts as

stated by Defendant are not only without reference to the record
but entirely outside it as far as the State can discern.5
In State v. Tucker. 657 P.2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982), the
Utah Supreme Court held that
[a] separate and independent basis for the
affirmance of the trial court is that the
defendant failed to refer to any portion of
the record that factually supports his
contentions on appeal.
This Court will
assume the correctness of the judgment below
5

The following facts as stated in Defendant's brief are
nowhere to be found in the record:
The media arrived at approximately 8:30
a.m. and questioned the policeman in charge.
The media left, and one of them returned at
approximately 9:00 a.m.
He stated, "I got
down to the station, and they asked if I got
pictures of them bringing marijuana out of
the house." The sheriff said, "no comment."
While the appellant's sister was talking
to the policemen, one of them said Mr. Bakker
had been involved with the police and drugs
for years, and that they had found 3 bales of
marijuana in the "basement." She asked why
they were not taking that outside the house
as they had the other marijuana.
The
policeman said they were waiting for a search
warrant to arrive at the scene.
Brief of Appellant at 3.
Although Defendant's sister gave
uncorroborated testimony that police officers removed a garbage
bag and guns from Defendant's home before obtaining a search
warrant (R. 469-70, 479-81), there is no support in the record
for Defendant's statement that "[t]he police did not leave an
inventory list with the appellant, nor at the residence." Id.
In fact, Defendant's sister testified that "they . . . handed us
the search warrant, what they had found, where they had found it"
(R. 470). Further, almost all of Defendant's description of what
happened between the assailant's knock on Defendant's door and
the arrival of the police, id, at 2, although mostly stated by
defense counsel at the motion-to-suppress hearing (R. 216-17),
was neither stipulated to by the State nor supported by testimony
at trial.
Thus, Defendant has submitted to this Court a
statement of facts scarcely supported by and never cited to the
record.
- 5 -

if counsel on appeal does not . . . mak[e] a
concise statement of facts and citation of
the pages in the record where they are
supported.
Similarly, in State v. Olmos. 712 P.2d 287, 287 (Utah 1986), the
court

noted

that

" [t]he record

in this case is sparse, and

defendant has failed to refer to pages of the record in support
of his points
require

us

on appeal.

to

assume

These deficiencies will

regularity

in

the

correctness in the judgment appealed from."

normally

proceedings

and

According to this

standard, this Court should not reach the merits of Defendant's
case.
II.

THE LIMITED, WARRANTLESS SEARCH CONDUCTED IN
THIS CASE FALLS WELL WITHIN THE EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEPTION TO THE WARRANT
REQUIREMENT.
The sole, substantive issue presented on this appeal is

whether police officers were justified under Mincey v. Arizona,
437

U.S.

385

controlling,6

(1978),

in making

which

the

State

a warrantless

acknowledges

search

of

is

Defendant's

^Defendant relies solely upon the fourth amendment to the
federal Constitution to support her claim.
In such instances,
the Utah Supreme Court has declared it will treat the case solely
under that amendment and not on state constitutional grounds.
State v. Earl. 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986); State v. Dorsev,
731 P.2d 1085, 1091 n.l (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring);
State v. Hackford. 737 P.2d 200, 205 n.3 (Utah 1987); State v.
Johnson. 60 Utah Adv. Rep. 30, 33 (1987) (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring); and State v. Egbert. 66 Utah Adv. Rep. 52, 55 n.l
(1987) (Durham, J., dissenting).
- 6 -

residence to see if there were other victims or if a killer was
still on the premises.7

The Mincey standard is as follows:

We do not question the right of the police to
respond to emergency situations.
Numerous
state and federal cases have recognized that
the Fourth Amendment does not bar police
officers from making warrantless entries and
searches when they reasonably believe that a
person within is in need of immediate aid.
Similarly, when the police come upon the
scene of a homicide they may make a prompt
warrantless search of the area to see if
there are other victims or if a killer is
still on the premises.
Cf. Michigan v.
Tyler, supra. [436 U.S. 499] at 509-510.
•The need to protect or preserve life or
avoid serious injury is justification for
what would be otherwise illegal absent an
exigency or emergency.•
Wayne v. United
States. 115 U.S. App. D.C. 234, 241, 318 F.2d
205, 212 (opinion of Burger, J.). And the
police may seize any evidence that is in
plain view during the course of their
legitimate emergency activities. Michigan v.
Tyler, supra, at 509-510; Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. [443], at 465-466.
Id. at 392 (footnotes omitted).

Applying the standard to the

facts in Mincey. the Court added,
But a warrantless search must be
'strictly circumscribed by the exigencies
which justify its initiation,•
Terry v.
Ohio. 392 U.S. [1], at 25-26, and it simply
cannot be contended that this search was
justified by any emergency threatening life
or limb.
All the persons in Mincey1 s
apartment had been located before the
7

The actual conduct of the search is not an issue.
Defendant contends only that the warrantless search inside her
residence should not have occurred at all. She makes no claim
on appeal that had a limited search under the exigent
circumstances exception been proper, opening the linen closet
door exceeded the limit. Indeed, whatever the exact size of the
closet door, it was certainly large enough to justify a
reasonable belief that the closet could conceal a victim or
suspect (R. 221, 224, 492, 494, 496, State's Exhibit 1-S).
- 7 -

investigating homicide officers arrived there
and began their search.
And a four-day
search that included opening dresser drawers
and ripping up carpets can hardly be
rationalized in terms of the legitimate
concerns that justify an emergency search.
Id. at 393.
Defendant contends that the warrantless search of her
residence was similarly unjustified.
however,

stand

in

sharp

contrast

The facts of this case,
to

those

in

Mincey

and

demonstrate a model balance between the right of the people to be
secure against "unreasonable searches and seizures," U.S. Const,
amend. IV, and the "right of the police to respond to emergency
situations.11
the

Mincey

Mincey at 392.
Court's

The balance is best expressed by

statement

that

"warrants

are

generally

required to search a person's home or his person unless 'the
exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so
compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment."

Id. at 393 (emphasis added).

In Mincey. the Court expressed no disapproval of the
initial victim-or-suspect search conducted by narcotics agents,
which revealed "a young woman wounded in the bedroom closet and
Mincey apparently unconscious in the bedroomf as well as Mincey's
three acquaintances (one of whom had been wounded in the head) in
the living room."

Jd.

at 388.

Only the search conducted by

homicide detectives who arrived after the scene had been secured
was held unconstitutional.

This search

lasted four days, during which period the
entire apartment was searched, photographed,
and diagrammed. The officers opened drawers,
- 8 -

closets, and cupboards, and inspected their
contents; they emptied clothing pockets; they
dug bullet fragments out of the walls and
floors; they pulled up sections of the carpet
and removed them for examination. Every item
in the apartment was closely examined and
inventoried, and 200 to 300 objects were
seized.
In short, Mincey's apartment was
subjected to an exhaustive and intrusive
search. No warrant was ever obtained.
Id. at 389 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).

In this case, as

supported by the record in the Statement of Facts, supra, a
limited, victim-or-suspect search of a homicide scene revealed a
controlled substance in plain view in an area where a victim or
suspect might reasonably be found.

This search was "strictly

circumscribed by the exigencies with justif[ied] its initiation,"
id. at 393, however, and went no further than an attempt to
locate persons injured or hiding on the premises.

A search

warrant was duly obtained before a more extensive search was
conducted.
in

a

Thus, the officers in this case conducted themselves

manner

consistent

with

good

police

work,

the

Mincey

standard, and the Fourth Amendment.
Defendant contends, however, that she did not consent
to the victim-or-suspect search and cites several cases holding
that

a

unlimited

call

for

emergency

assistance

does

not

constitute

consent to all manner of intrusive searches.

The

searches in all of these cases, however, went beyond the scope of
a limited, victim-or-suspect search so that consent was necessary

9 -

to

justify

irrelevant.
suspect

them.8

In

this

case,

Defendants

consent

is

The officers could lawfully have made the victim-or-

search

of

Defendants

residence

even

if

she

had

expressly forbidden it, since this type of search is justified by
the exigencies of the situation, not by consent.

Id. at 392.

Defendant further contends, however, that the officers
"[knew] as fact there was simply one victim . . . and [knew] as
fact the killer had never entered the house; and [knew] as fact
that the killer had fled the premises following the shooting."
Brief of Appellant at 8.

In addition to having allegedly been

informed of these facts upon their arrival, id. at 6, Defendant
asserts that "[t]he police were also in a position to observe
that

a trail

of blood

led

to the doorway

of the house in

question, and allowed them to conclude not only that the deceased
had been shot in that doorway, but had subsequently staggered out
to the driveway."
suspect

search

Id. at 10.
was

Defendant argues that a victim-or-

therefore

unjustified.

Defendant's

characterization of the circumstances, however, is unsupported by

B

In State v. Jolley. 68 N.C. App. 33, 314 S.E.2d 134 (1984),
rev'd, 312 N.C. 296, 321 S.E.2d 883 (1984), cert, denied, 470
U.S. 1051 (1985), the defendant had shot her husband and both had
been removed from the scene before a detective arrived and
conducted a six-hour search of the defendant's home. In People
v. Annerino, 97 111. App. 3d 240, 422 N.E.2d 923 (1981), the
premises had been already been secured when police officers
searched in a crawl space underneath the defendant's kitchen in
order to retrieve a bullet. In State v. Young. 135 Ariz. 437,
661 P.2d 1138 (Ct. App. 1982), cert, denied. 464 U.S. 866 (1983),
a police officer searched the dropped ceiling of a bar an hour
after the scene had been secured.
- 10 -

the record

and assumes too much, and her argument

fails to

consider relevant factors.

officers

The

only

account

of

what

when

they

arrived

at

the

stipulated

facts

suppress.
trial.

at

the

hearing

Defendant
scene

on

is

told
found

Defendant's

police
in the

motion

to

No additional evidence on the subject was adduced at
The stipulation was that the officer who spoke with

Defendant

"discovered

from

her

that

that

morning

boyfriend with whom she was living with her child

that

her

. . . had

received a knock at the door.

The boyfriend had responded to the

knock, there was heard a thud.

The boyfriend left the apartment,

chased after an assailant who had shot him in the chest, returned
to the apartment, and loudly and insistently cried out he had
been shot and asked for an ambulance to be called" (R. 214).
There are in this account two possible sources of confusion for
police officers:

First, Defendant apparently told the officer

that her child also lived at the residence, but the record does
not

show

whether

question.

the

child

present

on

the morning

in

If not, and if Defendant explained this absence, the

record does not show it.
potential

was

victim

transcript
assailants.

Thus, the child would be another

in the officer's mind.

reveals

some

uncertainty

Second,

about

the

the trial
number

of

Counsel for Defendant stated that "the neighbors

that they interviewed and the defendant, maybe the sister, but
anyone said that they—a guy had run away.

One of the witnesses,

I think, would have testified two guys ran away, but the bulk of
- 11 -

it is, a guy ran away." (R. 494). Thus, the exact status of the
two objects of a victim-or-suspect search was far more doubtful
than Defendant contends.
If police officers were to evaluate at length the story
of witnesses and the evidence at the scene in order to decide if
a victim-or-suspect search were warranted, the very purposes of
such a search
escape

of

in

immediately

suspects,

frustrated.

and

aiding victims, preventing

protecting

the

officers

would

the
be

This type of search must not be made to wait upon

witness interviews and evidence evaluation.

As in this case,

different officers may be assigned to simultaneously interview
witnesses and conduct a preliminary, victim-or-suspect search.
The officers

first arriving have neither time nor extensive,

specialized training to play the part of detectives and analyze
the subtle implications of evidence before acting to secure the
scene.

And witnesses, who may also be possible suspects, may be

distraught,

even hysterical, mistaken,

or lying.

Therefore,

officers should not debate and decide based on evidence analysis
or the account of witnesses whether to conduct a victim-orsuspect search, but should automatically conduct such a search
upon arriving at the scene of a violent crime.

This is the

course followed by the officers in this case.
This view is supported by the decision of the United
States
(1984).

Supreme

Court

in Thompson

v. Louisiana,

469 U.S. 17

In that case, police officers were called to a homicide

scene by the killerfs daughter, who informed the officers that
- 12 -

the killer had shot her husband and then ingested pills in a
suicide attempt before changing her mind and calling her daughter
for help.

The killers daughter directed deputies to the two

bedrooms containing the killer and the victim.
deputies

then

suspects.

searched

the

premises

for

Nevertheless, the
other

victims

or

Homicide investigators then arrived and conducted a

two-hour "general exploratory search for evidence of a crime.1'
Id. at 18.

The Court disapproved only the second warrantless

search, noting that "the evidence at issue here was not . . .
discovered during the 'victim-or-suspect' search that had been
completed by the time the homicide investigators arrived."

Id.

at 22.
The United

States Supreme

Court has held that the

reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the
particular circumstances must be judged against the following
objective standard:

"[W]ould the facts available to the officer

at the moment of the seizure or the search 'warrant a man of
reasonable caution
appropriate?"

in the belief

that the action taken was

Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).

Based upon

the foregoing arguments, the answer to this question in this case
is yes.

Therefore, the limited, warrantless, victim-or-suspect

search of Defendant's residence was constitutionally permissible,
and evidence which it revealed, or to which it led by forming the
basis for a search warrant, was properly admitted at Defendant's
trial.

- 13 -

CONCLUSION

Based
respectfully

upon

the

requests

foregoing

this

Court

arguments,
to

affirm

the

Defendant's

conviction.
DATED t h i s

P^-tfl

day of October, 1987.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
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STATE'S EXHIBIT 1-S

